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I. Introduction  
Participants and observers of the maritime industry have been claiming a 
trend internationally towards criminalising the actions of seafarers in modern years. 
This trend has been apparent since the mid-20th century and has many vocal 
industry participants declaring that it is disturbing and negatively impacts the 
maritime industry as a whole, particularly when the blame of large-scale pollution 
events are placed on seafarers themselves. The International Transport Workers’ 
Federation (“ITWF”) highlights these industry concerns:1  
In the modern maritime industry, reduced crews are expected to affect fast 
turnarounds and take ever greater responsibility for maritime security and 
pollution prevention. On the one hand they are subject to pressure from the 
company to remain economically competitive at all costs. On the other hand 
they face the threat of heavy-handed sanctions by States eager to find 
scapegoats for politically sensitive cases involving environmental damage. 
This paper looks at international discourse on this trend and examines 
whether it is reflected in New Zealand (“NZ”) by focusing on the statutory reality of 
the increasing criminalisation thesis. This maritime industry is largely regulated by 
the Maritime Transport Act 1994 (“MTA”). However, as with all jurisdictions, 
maritime specific laws do not exist in a vacuum. The MTA operates alongside 
maritime rules; the Crimes Act 1961; the Resource Management Act 1991 (“RMA”); 
anti-terrorism measures; health and safety legislation; employee rights; human 
rights; and international obligations.  
This research paper analyses the NZ dimension in the context of this 
international discussion. This paper has four main aims: 
1) To isolate the areas where industry participants believe there is a trend 
towards greater criminalisation; 
                                                        
1 International Transport Workers’ Federation “Out of sight, out of mind: Seafarers, Fishers and 
Human Rights” June 2006 at 29. Challengers assert is that the “criminalisation of accidental pollution 
may discourage feedback regarding incidents, failures, and even accidents and so inhibit their 
prevention” as well as the increasingly employment costs that such criminal sanctions trigger: see 
Kyriaki Mitroussi “Employment of seafarers in the EU context: Challenges and opportunities” (2008) 
32 Marine Policy at 1047. 
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2) To analyse legislative and policy developments in NZ, focusing on the MTA 
and earlier legislation;  
3) Determine whether NZ is following the international trend towards 
increased criminalisation of seafarers; and 
4) Highlight infamous cases giving rise to liability in this area and hypothetically 
applies them to the NZ context. 
The bulk of this paper focuses on the second aim above: Part IV identifies five 
areas of criminal responsibility. Every maritime offence and crime in NZ legislation 
has been examined.2 Part V is a forecasting exercise where I apply the facts of four 
international cases into the NZ framework and examine a ‘worse case’ scenario.  
This paper focuses on offences applicable only to seafarers (including masters) 
of merchant ships, in the course of their professional duties. There are sundry 
offences in NZ law which apply to “every person” but this paper only examines these 
in the context of seafarers’ professional duties. For example, offences under the 
recent legislation to combat piracy and terrorism through policing and border 
control – Maritime Crimes Act 1999 and Maritime Security Act 2004 – are outside 
the scope of this paper though both Acts are important pieces of legislation for NZ 
international obligations.3 I do not examine offences relating to harbour-masters; 
owners or employers of seafarers; warships or defence force members; port 
operators or facilities; pleasure craft; fishing boats; search and rescue operators; 
wrecks; nor marine structures and operations.4 Further, the paper does not look at 
the civil penalties for the same activities as examined in the criminal context, 
liability under the Maritime Insurance Act 1908, or the delegated authority of 
                                                        
2 For ease of discussion, Part IV divides these areas into (1) health and safety offences (including 
pollution and hazardous cargo situations); (2) emergency situations, collisions or accidents; (3) 
employment rights and obligations; (4) financial and regulatory responsibilities; and (5) obligations 
involving the administration of justice. 
3 See International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea 1184 UNTS 1185 (opened for signature 1 
November 1974, entered into force 25 May 1980). 
4 See sections 31(4) and 71(1) of the Maritime Transport Act 1994 [hereinafter referred to as the 
“MTA”]; Maritime New Zealand v Page [2013] DCR 102; and Sellers v Maritime Safety (5 November 
1998) CA104/98. 
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Maritime New Zealand (“MNZ”).5 This scope has been chosen due to the parallel 
international discussion and concerns with this subject. 
II. International criminalisation of seafarers 
A History and development  
While there is little legal scholarship on the background of maritime 
criminalisation, the claim of an international upward trend in criminalisation from 
industry proponents stems from the late 1980s. In March 1989, Captain Hazelwood 
four criminal charges relating to the grounding of his ship, Exxon Valdez: being 
intoxicated when operating a vessel; the negligent discharge of oil; criminal 
mischief; and reckless endangerment.6 Captain Hazelwood was eventually only 
convicted of a single charge after a staggering eight appeals – negligent discharge of 
oil – and received a sentence of 100 hours of community service in Alaska with a 
US$50,000 fine.7  
Since this incident in 1989, industry groups claim that there are an alarming 
number of prosecutions which are characterised by a lack of negligent behaviour 
proven or admitted in court on the part of the master or other seafarers. This trend 
is particularly evident in pollution disasters.8 The facts of these cases vary and may 
happen in NZ as readily as they have in jurisdictions overseas. Criminal sanctions for 
                                                        
5 See Part 25 of the MTA. 
6 John Hare “Criminalisation and Fair Treatment of Seafarers – Punishable Miscreants or Political 
Pawns?” (September 2011) The Nautical Institute Command Seminar, Cape Town at 3; and Ove Oving 
“Criminalisation of the ship’s master and his crew” (2012) Kalmar Maritime Academy, Linnaeus 
University at 5. 
7 Oving, above n 6, at 5. 
8 The ITWF highlights eight ships as evidence of this claim: Million Hope, Orapin Global, Erika, Asian 
Liberty, Amorgos, Prestige, Tasman Spirit and Celine. See International Transport Workers’ 
Federation, above n 1, at 29. I have identified eight others to add to this non-exhaustive list of 
criminal  maritime cases which have garnered high profile media attention: Aegan Sea, Nissos 
Amorgos, Tropic Brilliance, Zim Mexico II, Hebei Spirit, Full City, Asian Forest and Nordlake. See Hare, 
above n 6, at 3-4; Olivia Murray “Criminalisation of Seafarers – Recent Developments: Presentation to 
the international Working Group on the Fair Treatment of Seafarers” INCE and Co. at 4; Nautilus 
International “Criminalisation of seafarers” 
<http://content.yudu.com/Library/A1vef6/Criminalisationofsea/resources/index.htm?referrerUrl=
http%3A%2F%2Ffree.yudu.com%2Fitem%2Fdetails%2F466362%2FCriminalisation-of-
seafarers%3Frefid%3D44870> (2011) at 11; and Oving, above n 6, at 11. 
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seafarers include oil pollution outside of the control of the Master (Erika);9 
grounding due to bad weather (Full City);10 a ship sinking after being refused refuge 
by a coastal state for salvage (Prestige);11 grounding of a vessel under pilot control 
(Tasman Spirit);12 running aground due to unknown underwater bank collapses 
(Nissos Amorgos);13 a containership knocking over a port crane (Zim Mexico III);14 a 
tanker being hit by an out of control crane barge (Hebei Spirit);15 and violations 
relating to the oily water separator (Celine).16 All of these incidences had varying 
degrees of criminality associated with seafarers. Many involved seafarers being held 
for extended periods, eventually leading to high profile criminal cases, and a number 
of these cases required lengthy appeal processes to apportion blame correctly.17 
Part V of this paper will apply hypothetical scenarios based on four of these cases to 
the current NZ legislative framework and postulate what would happen in a ‘worst 
case’ scenario under NZ law.  
B International response and impact 
The international legal community has taken note of the overwhelming 
damage caused by pollution spills and has agreed various conventions to which 
states can accede. There are two conventions that have particular impact on this 
criminalisation discussion: the Protocol Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in 
Cases of Pollution by Substances other than Oil (“MARPOL”)18 and the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS”).19 MARPOL – short for marine 
pollution – is designed to minimise pollution accidents by regulating the passage of 
                                                        
9 Hare, above n 6, at 3. 
10 Nautilus International, above n 8, at 11; and Hare, above n 6, at 4. 
11 Nautilus International, as above, at 10; Hare, above n 6, at 3; and Murray, above n 8, at 13. 
12 Hare, above n 6, at 3. 
13 Oving, above n 6, at 5-6. 
14 At 8. 
15 Nautilus International, above n 8, at 9-10; and Hare, above n 6, at 3-4. 
16 Hare, above n 6, at 7. 
17 Murray, above n 8, at 4.  
18 Protocol Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Pollution by Substances other than 
Oil 1313 as modified by the Protocol of 1978 UNTS 1 (entered into force 30 March 1983) [hereinafter 
referred to as “MARPOL”]. 
19 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1833 UNTS 3 (opened for signature 10 December 
1982, entered into force 16 November 1994) [hereinafter referred to as “UNCLOS”]. 
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oil, dangerous goods, and harmful substances. Importantly, accidental spills do not 
violate MARPOL; there is no criminal liability for pollution or spills unless there is 
an intent or recklessness by seafarers, only prohibitions relating to the deliberate 
discharge of oil.20 MARPOL ensures that the laws of coastal states punish natural 
and legal persons “by effective, proportionate and dissuasive criminal penalties.” 21 
Part XII of UNCLOS gives coastal states the ability to adopt reasonable domestic 
measures to prevent pollution in their territorial waters.22 In their EEZ, states may 
adopt such laws if they are in conformity with, and give effect to, international rules 
and standards.23 This means that states are welcome to go further than the 
minimum standards when translating MARPOL and UNCLOS into their national 
laws.  
States frequently extend the protections afforded under MARPOL and UNCLOS 
in the area of pollution. The extreme example is in European Union (“EU”) 
legislation where the master, together with the owner, is criminally liable for an 
infringement if a discharge of oil occurs with intent, recklessness or serious 
negligence.24 EU legislation also imposes criminal sanctions for intentional, reckless, 
or seriously negligent ship-source pollution on any person who contributes to 
pollution, which in practice would most likely cover seafarers. Penalties range from 
significant fines – €150,000 to €1,500,000 – to imprisonment of up to five years.25 
This legislation is enforceable against all ships calling at EU ports.26 
                                                        
20 For a summary see Nicola Giovannini and others “Addressing Environmental Crimes and Marine 
Pollution in the EU” (2013) Droit au Droit, Brussels at 9-12. 
21 Articles 8, 8a, 8b and 8c of Directive 2005/35 [2005] OJ L 255. 
22 See Articles 192, 194, 211, 217 and 218, Part XII of UNCLOS. For a summary, see Giovannini, above 
n 20, at 12-14. 
23 The exclusive economic zone (the “EEZ”) extends to 200 nautical miles off the coast of a state. 
24 See Council Framework Decision 2005/667/JHA [2005] OJ L 255/164; and Directive 2005/35 
[2005] OJ L 255. 
25 Mitroussi, above n 1, at 1047; and Marc Huybrechts “Criminal Liability of Master and Crew in Oil 
Pollution Cases” in Michael Faure, Han Lixin and Shan Hongjun (eds) Maritime Pollution Liability and 
Policy: China, Europe and the US (Kluwer Law International, The Netherlands 2010) at 220. Some 
states go further than this EU standard. For example, French law has individual penalties for the 
worst kind of intentional pollution acts of up to €15 million and 10 years’ imprisonment: North P&I 
“France hits polluters hard” (April 2009) Signals Newsletter <www.nepia.com> at 5. 
26 Mitroussi, above n 1, at 1047. 
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The supporters of these types of criminal legislative instruments targeting 
maritime participants claim that such measures are necessary to improve maritime 
safety, but, as stridently argued by opponents, these regulations correspondingly 
have significant flow on effects.27 This is particularly true in the EU post-MARPOL 
primarily due to the size and reputation of the maritime industry but effects 
individuals enormously. The European Economic Union (“EEU”)28 alone sees over 
3.5 million tonnes of cargo annually transported on ships and EEU ship-owners 
control 40.8% of the global fleet measured in gross tonnage.29 Europe is also a high 
employer of seafarers making this criminalisation discussion particularly relevant.30 
It is also important to remember that criminal law is inherently personal and 
penalties generally work best against individuals rather than organisations.31 
Because the events giving rise to criminal liability in maritime law are often high 
profile and may involve vast property loss and personal damage, seafarers may 
become political scapegoats and be the target of undesirable outcomes. Seafarers 
are naturally reluctant to be held accountable for actions outside of their control; 
seafarers may become political hostages: “… seafarers might easily become the 
scapegoats as they are the ones who tend to be readily identified and primarily 
exposed to media and public criticism.” 32 
Reputational damage of seafarers is also a discernible outcome of criminal 
cases.33 This can have wellbeing and health effects, as occurred in the United States 
when the chief engineer of Celine, Ivan Peykoc, committed suicide on-board after the 
authorities started investigating suspected violations relating to the oily-water 
separator.34 Industry concerns link such pressure to the lessening of seafarers 
                                                        
27 At 1043; and International Transport Workers’ Federation, above n 1. 
28 The EEU is the EU plus Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein.  
29 See Mitroussi, above n 1, at 1043. 
30 Greece is the biggest employer (both Greek registered ships and Greek owned vessels) with around 
31,000 seafarers employed with another 11,000 working onshore. Mitroussi, above n 1, at 1045. 
31 At 1043. 
32 At 1047. 
33 As Erika’s Captain Karun experienced: See Part V Section Ba. 
34 Hare, above n 6, at 7; and Joe Brady Stamford “Stalemate in ‘Celine’ saga” (18 August 2005) 
TradeWinds <http://www.tradewindsnews.com>. 
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seeking employment in the industry: “although overall employment in the maritime 
business in Europe is stable, the number of European seafarers is declining ...”35  
C Penalties 
As evident in the infamous cases identified above and in more detail in Part V, 
these types of criminal cases can take many years to resolve and have substantial 
imprisonment sentences and/or fines attached to such incidents, particularly 
involving pollution. Industry spokespeople also report that such public attention 
and scrutiny results in unreasonably high criminal sanctions.36 A recent example of 
this the Korean ferry, Sewol, which sunk in April 2013 killing 300 crew and 
passengers. This was a terrible tragedy with a high death rate for which the Master, 
Lee Joonseok, received a 36-year prison term after being found guilty of negligence 
for failing to organise evacuation efforts and also leaving the ship before the 
passengers.37 Industry defenders believe that this is the most recent example of 
seafarers being used as pawns in a political game; that the drive to criminalise the 
behaviour of the seafarers was unjust for the rest of those in the maritime 
industry.38 The Captain was not found guilty of murder (or any other wrongful death 
charge) yet received an extreme sentence. On the other hand, the chief engineer of 
Sewol, Park Gi-ho, was found guilty of murder and sentenced to a lesser sentence of 
30 years. Thirteen other crewmembers currently face imprisonment sentences 
between five and 20 years.39  
Arguably, unlike the preceding examples, Zim Mexico III is a suitable case for 
criminalisation of a seafarer. In one of the rare high profile cases not involving 
pollution, a container ship knocked over a crane in Mobile, Alabama when her 
                                                        
35 Mitroussi, above n 1, at 1043.  
36 David Osler “Sewol jail terms too harsh, say seafarer organisations” (20 November 2014) Lloyd’s 
List Australia 9 at 9; and Gary Dixon “Top union slams severity of Sewol crew sentences” (14 
November 2014) Lloyd’s List Australia 7 at 7. 
37 This is effectively a life sentence as Captain Joonseok was aged 69 at the time of the incident. See 
Osler, as above, at 9; and Dixon, as above, at 7. 
38 Osler, as above, at 9; and Dixon, as above, at 7. 
39 Osler, as above, at 9; and Dixon, as above, at 7. 
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bowthruster failed when exiting the port.40 The shoreside crane fall crushed and 
killed electrician, Shawn Jacobs, who was working on the crane in March 2006.41 
The German Master of Zim Mexico III, Captain Schroeder, was arrested for 
contravening seaman manslaughter legislation in the United States.42 The Master 
agreed a plea bargain from manslaughter to simple negligence and was released 11 
months after the incident for time served.43 The Captain was acting within the scope 
of his duties at the time of the incident and he should have to take responsibility for 
the malfunction of the bowthruster. This case also indicates also that criminalisation 
of seafarers is not limited to Europe nor to pollution cases. 
D Jurisdictional challenges  
A factor of the maritime industry is the collision of various jurisdictions and 
laws. Seafarers contend with multiple jurisdictions – the flag state, coastal or port 
state, and the seafarer’s state of nationality.44 The Prestige case highlights this global 
reach: Prestige’s owners (Mere Shipping) were located in Greece and Liberia; she 
was flagged in the Bahamas; was in class with the American Bureau of Shipping; was 
chartered by a Swiss-based Russian company (Crown Resources) from their London 
office; was crewed by mainly Greek and Filipino seafarers; was sailing from Latvia to 
Singapore; and sunk off the coast of Spain.45 This global reach is an important trait 
                                                        
40 Oving, above n 6, at 8; and Michael Chalos and Eugene O’Connor “The ZIM Mexico III incident and 
the trial of Captain Schroeder – The complete saga” (1 August 2007) Grad News 
<http://www.gard.no>. 
41 Oving, above n 6, at 8; and Chalos and O’Connor, as above. 
42 The owner of the vessel was also charged as being vicariously liable for the Master’s actions. Chalos 
and O’Connor, as above. 
43 Oving, above n 6, at 8. 
44 See Giovannini, above n 20, at 5-6; Yvonne Baatz (ed.) Maritime Law (3rd ed, Routledge, New York, 
2014); Alla Pozdnakova Criminal Jurisdiction over Perpetrators of Ship-Source Pollution (Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, The Netherlands, 2012) at 2-5; and Michael Tsimplis “Shipping and the Marine 
Environment in the 21st Centry” in Malcolm Clarke (ed.) Maritime Law Evolving: Thirty Years at 
Southhampton (Hart Publishing Ltd, United Kingdom, 2013) at 106-112. 
45 Nautilus International, above n 8, at 10; and “Prestige oil tanker disaster crew acquitted in Spain” 
(13 November 2013) BBC <http://www.bbc.co.uk>. The Erika case also highlights this multi-
jurisdictional point: Permanent Commission of Enquiry into Accidents at Sea “Report of the enquiry 
into the sinking of Erika off the coasts of Brittany on 12 December 1999” Permanent Commission of 
enquiry into accidents at sea <http://www.beamer-france.org/BanqueDocument/pdf_87.pdf> at 9-
11. 
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of the maritime industry.46 This multi-jurisdictional puzzle is confusing and is an 
intimidating and daunting problem for seafarers that workers in other industries do 
not generally have to grapple with.47 Often seafarers who are caught up in criminal 
action will not be nationals of the state where the incident occurs; prior knowledge 
of the law is difficult to assume in such cases.48 Michael Lund, BIMCO's Chief 
Shipping Policy and Economics Officer, reiterated this in an industry speech:49 
 … seafarers may be prosecuted in a wide range of jurisdictions for a wide range 
of offences and under a number of laws, which make it virtually impossible for 
the individual seafarer to have knowledge of the criminal risks associated with 
a given action. 
NZ’s maritime laws make up one part of this international jurisdictional 
discussion. This paper now will discuss NZ legislation to determine whether NZ is 
following international trends promoting criminalisation of seafarers. NZ has had 
few prosecutions in this area so the reality might be different in practice but the 
potential is located in the criminal source law. 
III. New Zealand maritime industry 
Given its geographic isolation, NZ has always been dependent on shipping. NZ, 
as a country, also places emphasis on the protection of the physical environment 
and taiao (natural world), including tai (the sea) and papamoana (the seabed).50 
This means that this jurisdiction has a stake in maintaining environmental controls 
in, and on, the sea. While there are no merchant ships currently flagged under NZ 
                                                        
46 For example, that EU sanctions apply “…irrespective of the flag, which the vessel would fly, and the 
Directive is applicable starting from internal waters, to territorial seas and into the high seas. The 
sanctions have to apply to the owner, the master, the crew, the salvour, the charterer and the 
classification society, in other words, everyone who is connected with the incident and shares some 
responsibility for the incident”: Huybrechts, above n 25, at 221. 
47 International Transport Workers’ Federation, above n 1, at 32. 
48 Michael Lund “Speech for International Seminar of Russian Register of Shipping 22-23 October 
2008 Quality Shipping: XXI Century Standard. Seafaring Careers: Raising the Profile” (20 October 
2008) at 4. 
49 As above. 
50 See as examples: section 4 of the Marine and Coastal Area (Takutai Moana) Act 2011; section 5 of 
the Resource Management Act 1991 [hereinafter referred to as the “RMA”]; and section 10 of the 
Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf (Environmental Effects) Act 2012. 
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law that regularly operate on international routes, various shipping companies 
operate in NZ – in 2013, fishing company Sanford Limited had 51 vessels.51 
Merchant ships from all around the world visit NZ’s waters and ports on a daily 
basis and thus this discussion is relevant. 
While it has been argued that NZ has “one of the least regulated shipping 
regimes in the world”,52 this is not true in practice. NZ has a history of 
comprehensive regulation in the maritime industry and there are two main pieces of 
legislation in the past sixty years: the Shipping and Seamen Act 1952 (“SSA”) and the 
MTA. The SSA came into force on 19 November 1953. By the time it was repealed on 
1 February 1995 it was very different from what was enacted forty years earlier. 
The SSA was the focus of considerable amendments which made this statutory 
instrument lengthy, but also made it difficult to reconcile what summary offences or 
indictable crimes each penalty would attach to. Such amendments to the SSA 
reflected global changes in workers and employees rights; technological 
advancements; and an increasing amount of international obligations particularly in 
protection of environments in the late 1980s. The SSA ended up as a mixed bundle 
of rights and responsibilities as a mixed and incomprehensible bundle, so by the 
early 1990s there was a push for a more cohesive Act.  
Of note, the SSA contained a catch-all provision whereby if the Act states a 
“crime”53 and there is no special penalty attached, then that person shall be liable for 
imprisonment not exceeding two years and/or a fine not exceeding $1,000.54 There 
is also a comparable section regarding an “offence”55 whereby the penalty is a fine 
not exceeding $1,000, unless a special penalty is provided in the section,56 with a 
continuing fine of $50 per day for which the offence continues.57 The MTA is much 
clearer here and reflects the evolution of legislation so that crimes are seen as more 
                                                        
51 Sanford Limited “Health and Safety Reform Bill Sanford Limited Submission” (7 May 2014) at 2. 
52 Gareth Hughes (Green) (11 September 2012) 683 NZPD 5080. 
53 Section 479 of the Shipping and Seamen Act 1952 [hereinafter referred to as the “SSA”]. 
54 Section 479. 
55 Section 480. 
56 Section 480(2). 
57 Section 480(3). 
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serious (such as murder and sexual offences under the Crimes Act 1961) and 
offences less serious (such as trespass under the Summary Offences Act 1981 and 
the possession of controlled substances under the Misuse of Drugs Act 1975). This is 
clarification evident in the cohesive drafting in the MTA. 
The MTA was first introduced to the House of Representatives as the 
Transport Reform Bill on 5 May 1993.58 The part of the Bill dealing with the 
maritime industry eventually evolved into the MTA – replacing the outdated SSA – 
alongside an Act regulating the civil aviation industry.59 The MTA applies to all NZ 
ships wherever they may be.60 The MTA also replaced the Marine Pollution Act 1974 
(“MPA”).  
A particular focus of this current Act is implementing NZ’s obligations under 
international law (particularly conventions relating to pollution of the marine 
environment); ensuring that participants in the maritime transport system are 
responsible for their individual actions; and protecting the natural environment.61 
These are the overriding principles of the MTA pivotal to this discussion of 
criminalisation. Importantly, most of the offences that appeared in the SSA are 
provided for in the MTA if they are still relevant in today’s age, albeit in updated 
‘new’ language and are often stated in terms that are more general. For example, 
there are no longer specific provisions relating to the engagement of illegal 
workers/aliens or the carriage of grain and flax, as these are largely irrelevant and 
are covered by general MTA obligations.  
There are three categories of seafarers to which criminal liability can attach to 
under the MTA. These definitions are provided in section 2 and are summarised as 
follows:62 
- “Seafarer” is the general term for any person who is employed or 
engaged on a ship in any capacity for reward or for hire.  
                                                        
58 Maritime Transport Bill 1993 (select committee report) I.13A at 2. 
59 Civil Aviation Act 1990. 
60 Section 4(4) of the MTA.  
61 Preamble (b), (c), (f) and (g). 
62 Note that all three definitions contained in section 2 of the MTA exclude pilots. 
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There are then two subsets of seafarers: 
- The “master”, being the person having command or charge of a ship (for 
identification purposes, masters will generally have the title of 
‘Captain’); and  
- “Crew” who are all other seafarers employed or engaged on a ship other 
than the master.  
Some provisions of the MTA are drafted so that offences apply to “any person” or 
“every person” which encompasses all seafarers. However, the majority of offences 
in the MTA target the master as the person in charge of the ship at the time the 
offence was committed.  
IV. Criminal responsibility 
This paper will examine several areas of responsibility where seafarers are 
liable under domestic law. I have placed these into five categories of offences for this 
discussion: (a) health and safety; (b) emergencies, collisions, or accidents; (c) 
employment rights and obligations; (d) financial and regulatory responsibilities; 
and (e) administration of justice. Every maritime offence and crime in NZ legislation 
has been reviewed in this analysis. In undertaking this examination, it is evident that 
the main area of increasing criminalisation for seafarers is in relation to pollution 
offences. These offences particularly affect masters.  
A Health and safety 
Health and safety offences in the maritime industry span several legislative 
instruments but have remained mostly constant through NZ’s history, except for 
pollution offences (particularly for dangerous or hazardous cargo).63 This area is 
heavily influenced by international obligations and is an active and live issue in NZ, 
particularly in light of the recent 2012 amendment Bill whereby NZ acceded to the 
                                                        
63 This paper will not discuss sections 60, 62 and 63 of the MTA as repelled by section 35(1)(d) of the 
Health and Safety in Employment Amendment Act 2002. I focus on the current offences expressly 
relating to seafarers.  
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1973 Protocol Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Pollution by 
Substances other than Oil.64 There are still weaknesses in acceding international 
conventions relating to deliberate and accidental pollution acts – for example, NZ 
has not acceded to all annexes of MARPOL.65 Despite this gap, and as expected, there 
are numerous provisions relating to pollution in the MTA. Of note is that 
responsibility for the compliance of the vast majority of these provisions lies with 
the master rather than the crew. The current provisions relating to dangerous cargo 
go further than was provided for in the SSA and MPA. This is expected and 
reasonable given the vast impact – politically and environmentally – of pollution 
cases. Interestingly, there were no comparable offences in previous legislation 
regarding hazardous cargo. These types of situations, together with pollution and oil 
spills, would have fallen under all-purpose health and safety requirements of the 
SSA, particularly pertaining to dangerous goods or unseaworthiness. This area of 
criminal responsibility shows that these new offences are a product of the evolving 
nature of the maritime industry and education lessons from past disasters. 
There are also some new broad offences relating to health and safety – such as 
safety equipment and wellbeing of crew. Most of these offences will in practice apply 
to masters only, as they have control of the ship and crew, though the offences are 
commonly expressed as applying to all persons.  
a. Dangerous/hazardous cargo 
There is a general offence for breaching any MTA requirement when carrying 
dangerous goods.66 This is in contrast to the SSA’s particular rules and offences 
relating to the carriage of grain;67 livestock;68 wool; flax; tow; skins; or other goods 
liable to spontaneous combustion;69 and unpermitted deck cargo.70 The MTA does 
                                                        
64 Protocol Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Pollution by Substances other than 
Oil, above n 18. 
65 This was stated during the Bill’s debate by a Green Party Member of Parliament: See Denise Roach 
(Green) (11 September 2012) 683 NZPD 5080. 
66 Section 67B(1)(b) of the MTA  
67 Section 309 of the SSA.  
68 Section 313A(4).  
69 Section 311(2).  
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not go into this amount of detail though the Director of MNZ (“Director”) can seize, 
or impose conditions on, ships or products if there are issues of endangerment.;71 
Seafarers are protected from prosecution if they are not “familiar with essential 
shipboard procedures for the safe operation of the ship.”72 
Only a master can be liable for the discharge or escape of hazardous 
substances into the sea or seabed.73 This is an overarching clause and shares the 
most severe penalty under the MTA (with insurance offences) being imprisonment 
of up to two years or a fine not exceeding $200,000.74 Alongside this general 
obligation of the master, lie more specific obligations: The master is the only 
seafarer who can commit the offence of failing to report harmful discharge;75 failing 
to notify incidents of pollution;76 and failing to notify the arrival of a ship carrying oil 
or noxious liquid substances or the transfer of such substances.77 The master is 
likewise liable for a fine of up to $200,000 if they store hazardous waste in the sea 
or on the seabed.78 Correspondingly, if waste is taken onto a ship with the purpose 
of being dumped (or is dumped), an offence is committed which the master is liable 
for with the same penalties.79 Any person who exports waste for dumping or 
incineration is liable for an offence with the same penalties.80 This could extend to 
seafarers who may have knowledge of dumping before it occurs or who may be 
operating under the (unlawful) direction of the master or others in authority. 
It was previously an offence under the MPA whereby the master was liable for 
any pollutant if it was discharged or escaped into NZ waters or was dumped.81 There 
                                                                                                                                                                     
70 Section 313(3).  
71 Section 55(9) of the MTA  
72 Section 55(3).  
73 Section 237. 
74 See section 237(1). 
75 Section 238. 
76 Section 239. 
77 Sections 240 and 241. 
78 Masters may also be liable for $10,000 for each day of continuing offence; costs associated with 
putting the act right; and three times the value of any commercial gain. Sections 263(5) and 266.  
79 Sections 264(1), 264(2), 264(6) and 266.  
80 Sections 264(7) and 266.  
81 Sections 3(1) and 21(1)(f) of the Marine Pollution Act 1974 [hereinafter called “MPA”].  
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was a comparable offence for NZ ships outside of NZ waters.82 Limited defences 
were available to the master, such as for preventing damaging to the ship or her 
crew, or if the discharge occurred due to major structural damage.83 The penalty for 
breaching these sections was a $50,000 fine and in the case of waste dumping they 
were liable for clean-up costs too.84 It was also an offence to transfer oil or 
pollutants to or from any ship in a NZ harbour without the correct notice (unless the 
fire brigade was supervising) punishable against the master of a fine not exceeding 
$3,000.85 
The MTA also introduces the concept of maintaining maritime documents, 
including the requirement for seafarers to be certified as fit and proper persons.86 
Any person holding a maritime document who causes unnecessary danger to 
persons or property, irrespective of whether the damage or injury eventuates, 
commits an offence.87 They also commit an offence if they operate, maintain or 
service anything on a ship or product which causes unnecessary damage to persons 
or property.88 Hefty penalties attach to these criminal safety breaches whereby 
individuals are liable for up to 12 months imprisonment or a fine of up to $10,000 
for each day of delay.89 Individuals can also be disqualified from holding maritime 
documentation, or imposition of conditions on documentation.90 This affects 
seafarers as they will hold appropriate documentation and may impact their 
certification prospects in the fit and proper person category.  
This area of criminality was highlighted in NZ after the grounding of Rena in 
2011 as discussed in Part V(A). 
                                                        
82 Section 4(1).  
83 Sections 6(1) and 6(2).  
84 Sections 10(a) and 21(2).  
85 Section 14.  
86 Maritime New Zealand “Fit and proper person check” <www.maritimenz.govt.nz>. 
87 Section 64(1) of the MTA.  
88 Section 65(1).  
89 Individuals are also liable for three times the value of any commercial gain. Section 64(1).  
90 For a breach of sections 65(1) or 65(2): see Section 73(1). 
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b. Marine protection documentation  
New to the MTA regime, is the requirement to hold the current and necessary 
marine protection documents. These documents outline standards for carrying oil 
and noxious liquid substances as prescribed by MARPOL and other international 
regulations after the cases involving vast international damage. Any person is liable 
for a criminal offence if they act without necessary documentation;91 act in breach;92 
or if they know that a current document is required for an act to be lawfully 
undertaken,93 even in emergencies.94 It is an offence for any person to fail to comply 
with an audit or inspection by the Director, or when detaining or seizing products 
relating to such documentation without reasonable excuse.95 This would capture 
seafarers who are travelling on a ship which is required to have such 
documentation, but it is questionable whether crew would have the requisite 
knowledge whether documentation was current. In any event, in practice the 
burden of this offence would likely fall with the master as he would be the person 
with the knowledge.  
c. Notifications and investigations of oil spills  
Seafarers have a current obligation to (a) notify the Director or regional 
council of the inability to contain or clean-up a marine oil spill and (b) follow the 
Director’s instructions, or they are guilty of an offence.96 The comparable 
requirement appeared in the MPA whereby it was the duty of the master to report 
discharges punishable by a fine of up to $10,000.97 It is questionable whether 
seafarers would know that notification has taken place, however it is a reasonable 
public policy consideration to ensure that such spills are notified effectively.  
Of note, every person commits an offence if they disobey instructions relating 
to the protection of the marine environment, or wilfully obstructing others from 
                                                        
91 Sections 277(1) and 279.  
92 Sections 278 and 279.  
93 Sections 277(2), 279 and 280.  
94 Section 403(2).  
95 Sections 402 and 403(1).  
96 Sections 253(4) and 317.  
97 Section 16 of the MPA.  
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acting in compliance of such instructions, or obstructing the Director in their 
duties.98 This obstruction comes with a high penalty of up to two years 
imprisonment or a fine not exceeding $200,000, with $10,000 for each day of delay 
of compliance. Individuals can only be imprisoned if they had the mandatory 
knowledge to intend to commit the offence or was reckless to the act and if the 
offence caused, or was likely to cause, serious damage to the marine environment. 
This shows the importance that the marine environment has on this current 
legislative framework in NZ. 
Seafarers have general obligations in this area and non-compliance with these 
obligations is an offence: 
- Every person who, without reasonable cause, fails to comply with an 
investigation relating to pollution commits an offence and is liable for a 
fine not exceeding $1000.99 Reasonably, a seafarer may be called to give 
evidence or reproduce information as part of an investigation and if 
they refuse, they will be held criminally liable. This offence could 
stretch to other people outside the industry, such as family members or 
government officials.  
- If the Director issues a requirement to rectify hazardous conditions; to 
take precautionary measures in the event of oil or noxious liquid 
substances; or to provide reception facilities, then every person must 
follow these directives.100 Each violator faces a fine of $10,000 and 
$2,000 per day of non-compliance.101  
- Every person must abide by prohibitions in relation to transferring oil 
or noxious liquid substances or face a fine not exceeding $5,000 and 
$1,000 for each day of delay.102 These offences apply to both crew and 
master. 
                                                        
98 Sections 253, 253(1), 253(4) and 253(5) of the MTA.  
99 Section 235(6) of the MTA. 
100 Section 242. 
101 Section 244(3).  
102 Sections 242A and 245.  
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d. Health and wellbeing of crew 
The master of any ship approaching NZ is responsible for ascertaining the 
state of health of each person on board under section 102(1) of the Health Act 1956. 
Upon arrival, the master has to deliver a health declaration to the correct 
authorities.103 If the master fails to do so then he commits an offence and is liable for 
a nominal fine not exceeding $1,000,104 or $2,000 if the master deceives or 
otherwise influences others under this section.105 In most cases, this will be the 
responsibility of the operator of the ship so the offence targets the master’s role. 
This area of criminal responsibility was comprehensive in the SSA. For example, the 
every person was liable if they breached the requirement to procure the services of 
a doctor as soon as possible after an on-board injury.106 The master was responsible 
to providing a supply of medicines – “antiscorbutics”107 – and medical handbooks.108 
Every person who manufactured, sold or kept any medicines for use on board a ship 
that were of bad quality or deficient in strength committed an offence.109 The master 
also had a requirement under this SSA to provide suitable, clean, habitable, and 
serviceable accommodation for crew that was not used for any other purpose.110 
e. Number of seafarers 
In the MTA anyone who breaches the regulations for operating a ship without 
the required number of seafarers or qualified personnel commits an offence.111 This 
offence was similarly outlined in section 55(6) of the SSA but more detailed, such as 
a ship cannot proceed to seas with less than four-fifths of the total persons on deck 
or engine room otherwise the ship faced detention.112 The SSA also states that, 
unless there is an emergency, crew cannot be employed in another capacity than 
                                                        
103 Section 102(2) of the Health Act 1956. 
104 Section 102(5). 
105 Section 102(6). 
106 Section 141(2) of the SSA. 
107 Sections 138(8), 138(9) and 138(10).  
108 Sections 138(8), 138(9) and 138(10). Section 239(5) also provided an offence for any provision of 
medicines that did not follow any gazette regulations. 
109 Section 138(11).  
110 Section 145(8). 
111 Section 67B(1)(a) of the MTA.  
112 Sections 55(6) and 55(7) of the SSA. 
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what they entered on-board,113 and provides the rules for vessels under towage.114 
Once again, in practice these offences will apply against masters as they are in 
charge of their vessel.  
f. Load lines 
It is an offence under the MTA if any person allows the ship’s load lines to 
submerge when proceeding to sea, during a voyage, or at a ship’s arrival to port. 
Hefty penalties attach to these criminal breaches whereby individuals are liable for 
up to 12 months imprisonment or a fine of up to $10,000 for each day of delay.115 All 
participants in the maritime industry could be liable – from seafarers on board to 
workers loading the ships. This is a new provision in the 2012 amendment reforms 
and was slightly different than provided for in the SSA.116 Under the SSA, the master 
was guilty of an offence for failing to have a correct load line certificate; if the load 
line was incorrectly marked on the ship;117 or for the markings were not 
maintained.118 Any person was guilty of an offence if they concealed; removed; 
altered; defaced; or obliterate a load line mark (or permits another person to do 
so).119 The master was responsible for framing and displaying the load line 
certificate.120 
There has evolved a concern for vessels carrying iron sand particularly from 
Port Taharoa on the west coast of the North Island between Hamilton and Auckland 
under these MTA provisions. The justification for this strict adherence to load lines 
is given that even a small allowance and discretion over the load lines can represent 
thousands of tonnes of overload. This is unsafe if conditions change and thus 
                                                        
113 Section 55(9). 
114 Section 55A(5A). 
115 Individuals are also liable for three times the value of any commercial gain. Section 67A(1) of the 
MTA.  
116 Ministry of Transport and Ministry for the Environment Marine Legislation Bill 2012: Report of the 
Ministry of Transport and the Ministry for the Environment (2012) at 72. 
117 Subject to a fine of $10,000: See Section 262(2) of the SSA. 
118 Subject to a fine of $10,000: Section 264(1). Similar obligations for submersion load lines as well: 
see sections 270(15) and 270(16).  
119 Section 264(2). 
120 Section 262(2). 
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everyone involved has a responsibility to monitor this position.121 Once again, it is 
reasonable that the practical burden of these obligations will fall to the person 
operating and in charge of the vessel: the master. 
g. Safety items and surveying of ships 
There were historical provisions relating to safety equipment and surveying of 
ships; there are no comparable provisions in the MTA. The legislation went into 
detail about what is required including such as anchors and chain cables;122 
navigational equipment;123 safety equipment;124 radio equipment;125 automatic pilot 
and testing of steering gear;126 and hull openings and water tightness.127 
Punishments for failing to comply with safety equipment requirements were steep: 
a fine of $1000 and a continuing further amount of $100 for each day of non-
compliance. There were also obligations in the SSA regarding surveying,128 and the 
notice and carrying out construction work on ships.129 The surveyor yielded power 
under the SSA and MPA and it was an offence against the master if the ship sailed 
without surveyor certification that the ship had passed requirements;130 or if the 
master failed to produce the certificate for customs or an authority.131 If the 
surveyor requested information on the ships age, tonnage, fuel and capacity, every 
person was liable for an offence if this information was not given;132 though in 
                                                        
121 Ministry of Transport and Ministry for the Environment, above n 116, at 74. 
122 Sections 233, 300 and 301 of the SSA. There are two particular offences whereby the master is 
liable for using an uncertified, untested anchor that may be displaying a fake distinctive mark. Every 
person (but in practice, manufacturers) was liable for an offence if they false mark an anchor under 
section 302(2), 
123 Section 234.  
124 Section 235.  
125 Section 236.  
126 Section 237.  
127 Section 238.  
128 Section 210. 
129 Sections 196(5), 197(g), 198(4) and 199(2).  
130 Sections 208(2) and 220(5). It was also an offence against the master if there was more than one 
certificates for a ship and the logbook did not state, at the start of the voyage, which certificate the 
ship was sailing under: see section 223(3). See also sections 7(4) and 8(4) of the MPA. 
131 Sections 208(3) and 220(7) of the SSA. 
132 Section 209 of the SSA. 
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practice this offence targeted owners and agents. Such certificates needed to be 
displayed and the master was liable for failure to do so.133 
h. Other offences 
There are a few additional health and safety related offences that carry 
penalties for non-compliant seafarers. These areas of responsibility are reasonably 
attributable to seafarers as they require knowledge or are role-related. Such 
offences carry imprisonment penalties for anyone breaching the regulations: for 
operating a ship outside its prescribed operating limits;134 knowingly breaching any 
requirement in the MTA for the carriage of dangerous goods;135 or acting without 
the necessary, appropriate, and current maritime documentation.136 It is also an 
offence to fail to comply with an audit request in relation to the holder of a maritime 
document or for the health and safety of seafarers.137 This latter offence can lead to 
disqualification of a maritime document or the position of conditions for up to 12 
months.138  
Generally the MTA offence provisions encompass a range of different 
scenarios. There are similar provisions in the preceding legislation however, once 
again, health and safety offences under the SSA are more specific in nature – for 
example detailing that the master is criminally liable if the ship does not carry 
current charts, directions, lighthouse notices, tide tables, or compasses.139 It was a 
particular offence under the SSA not labelling the nature of dangerous goods on the 
outside of package as well as on the same side as the address.140 Until 1987, it was 
also an offence against the master if the ship did not carry radar or an echo-
                                                        
133 Section 231(2). 
134 Section 67B(1)(b) of the MTA.  
135 Section 67B(1)(c).  
136 Sections 68(1), 68(2) and 69A.  
137 Section 70.  
138 Section 73(1).  
139 Sections 28(5) and 208A(5) of the SSA.  
140 Section 303(2). It was an offence under section 303(2) to carry dangerous goods without 
distinctly physically marking them and giving notice. It was also an offence under section 304 to mis-
describe dangerous goods. However, it was also an offence to not follow the rules and regulations in 
relation to dangerous goods per section 307(3). 
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sounding device141 and there were rules as to ballast.142 There were also large 
penalties which attached to piloting.143 
B Emergencies, collisions or accidents 
This area targets obligations after an accident in an emergency. The blame is 
apportioned, unsurprisingly, to those with the responsibility to control such acts on-
board the ship. Both the MTA and SSA hold the master accountable for criminal 
offences relating to emergency situations, collisions or accidents.  
a. Emergencies  
Effectively the obligations on the master in emerges remain constant through 
the MTA and SSA. The MTA contains a general statement about following all 
directions and statutory obligations in the event of an emergency. The Master 
carries the burden of carrying out these obligations and if a master fails to perform 
their duties without reasonable excuse then they commit an offence.144 In an 
emergency, the master must notify the Director as soon as practically possible if 
they have to breach their duties in the interests of safety and must follow any 
emergency maritime rules.145 The SSA deals with collisions and emergencies and 
contains a whole raft of specific offences. For example, in the SSA the master was 
criminally liable for failing to obey collision regulations;146 falsely using distress 
signals;147 not reporting ice near the ship’s course at night;148 and reporting 
unexpected dangers to navigations including hurricanes and other storms.149 There 
                                                        
141 Sections 210A(6) and 210B(6).  
142 Section 310(3) of the SSA and section 11(d)(i) of the MPA. Offence was punishable by a fine not 
exceeding $3,000: section 11(7).  
143 Sections 265(3) and 238A(2) of the SSA. Section 67(1) of the SSA outlines the penalties for 
individuals being up to 12 months imprisonment or a fine of up to $10,000 with additional penalties 
being available the cost being three times the value of any commercial gain. 
144 Section 19(4) of the MTA. The duties are outlined in section 19(1)(d) of the MTA.  
145 Sections 19(4) and 38(1) of the MTA. The penalties for not obeying emergency rules are fines not 
exceeding $5,000 for individuals: See section 38(1). 
146 Section 287(2) of the SSA.  
147 Sections 293(3) and (5).  
148 Section 295(2).  
149 Section 296(2).  
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were also specific requirements on the master to have warning devices, emergency 
illumination and means of egress for all persons,150 and displaying safety notices.151 
Of note is the offence contained in the SSA that every person was guilty of a 
crime who sends a ship to sea that is unseaworthy and a threat of the life of any 
person.152 The master is also liable under a separate section.153 While this is wider 
than simply an emergency, it is clear that there is an element of reporting and self-
interest that is required by seafarers. The same issues crop up here in that they 
might not have the requisite knowledge to know that the ship has a problem that 
makes it a threat to life or they might be under an order to sail anyway. This is not 
replicated in the MTA although, though there is the generalist offence if anyone 
operates, maintains or services anything on a ship or product which causes 
unnecessary damage to persons or property.154 This is the comparable offence albeit 
worded differently.  
b. Answer distress calls and provide navigation assistance 
The master currently has an express duty to assist persons and ships in 
danger, to respond to distress calls and “shall proceed with all speed”155 to the 
assistance of persons and master in distress.156 The master also has a duty to assist 
persons in danger as far as they can do so without serious danger to their ship or 
persons.157 An offence is committed if the master of any NZ ship, or any ship in NZ 
waters, does not report to nearby ships any dangers to navigation including if a 
navigation aid is moved or displaced. This general offence relating to assistance also 
existed in the SSA but the penalties were less strict. Under current legislation the 
penalty of disobeying these sections is high: imprisonment not exceeding 12 months 
and/or a fine not exceeding $100,000. This means that, if it is safe to do so, the 
                                                        
150 Section 202A(6).  
151 Section 204.  
152 Section 314(1).  
153 Section 314(2).  
154 Section 65(1) of the MTA.  
155 Section 32(6).  
156 Section 32(6).  
157 Section 26(6). The penalty is a fine not exceeding $10,000 under section 33(2). 
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master currently must: respond fast to all distress calls unless they are informed 
that assistance is not required; assist any person found at sea; assist the ship, crew 
and passengers post-collusion; and, after a collusion, they must inform the other 
ship’s master of the ship’s name, port of register and the port it will sail to.  
Under the SSA, the master had a duty to render assistance to the other ship 
and stay near unless it was ascertained that there was no need for further 
assistance.158 The master was also under an unambiguous obligation to take in 
seamen who were in distress and provide them with a bed or sleeping place 
protected against the sea and weather.159 The master committed an offence if they 
failed to assist persons in danger at sea; “even if that person is a subject of a State at 
war with Her Majesty”160 unless doing so would create serious danger to own ship 
or seafarers. In practice, there is no increased criminalisation in this area though the 
obligations are outlined differently in the legislation.  
c. Death or injury 
A master of a NZ ship, a foreign ship in NZ waters, or an operator of such ship 
must report any mishaps or accidents (including death or injury) as soon as 
practicable.161 Every person is liable for this offence of a fine up to $5,000162 though 
in practice it will only be those individuals with the respective responsibility (the 
master or second-in-command) rather than each individual without a role to play 
who have this burden. Similar provisions existed in the SSA whereby the master had 
to report any accident causing death or serious injury or effecting seaworthiness of 
the ship.163 This is no increased criminalisation in this area. 
                                                        
158 Sections 294(5), 294(7) and 289(2) of the SSA. All decisions had to be logged in the ship’s logbook 
per section 290(2). 
159 Section 130(3).  
160 Section 292(1).  
161 Section 71(1) of the MTA.  
162 Section 71(1).  
163 Sections 297(1) and 297(4) of the SSA.  
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C Employment rights and obligations  
There are rules surrounding the employment of seafarers. These requirements 
have evolved over the past fifty years taking into account new international 
developments about youth labour and work quality. The MTA exhibits this trend 
towards employees’ rights, but is mostly silent on the employment of seafarers; 
general employment law would capture most employment obligations. This is a 
significant change from the SSA where the master was criminally liable – and so was 
the chief engineer in certain circumstances164 – if crewmembers did not have an 
employment agreement.165 This was largely union driven and such collective 
agreements had to be conspicuously posted and displayed166 and delivered within 
the ship’s arrival at port,167 presumably as evidence of such an agreement. Similarly, 
all crew changes had to be notified by the master to authorities.168 Any person, 
including seafarers, who removed, defaced or destroyed such displayed agreement, 
committed an offence.169 These prescriptive offences no longer exist. 
a. Age, nationality and skills 
Nationality restrictions do not exist. Previously, there were restrictions on the 
employment of aliens on ships as masters, first mates, or the chief engineer.170 There 
is no comparable section or offence in the MTA. 
There are still age restrictions for the employment of seafarers however. In 
most cases, persons under the age of 18 cannot be engaged on a ship. 18 years old is 
the earliest someone can be employed as a trimmer or stoker unless reasonable 
steps have been taken; and it is an offence for employers of seafarers to neglect to 
keep a register of those seafarers employed under the age of 18.171 While this 
offence relates to an employer, in practice the master may be in charge of 
                                                        
164 Section 47(4). 
165 Sections 32(4) and 33(3). 
166 Section 36(2). 
167 Section 35(2). 
168 Section 45(4). 
169 Section 36(3. 
170 Section 17(A). 
171 Section 71(3) of the MTA.  
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maintaining the on-board register. It was an offence under the SSA if the master did 
not maintain a list of crew, if someone under the age of 15 was employed, and if a 
seafarer under the age of 18 was not certified as fit for employment.172 Interestingly, 
parents or guardians committed an offence if they knowingly caused or permitted 
youth to be employed in contravention of the SSA.173  
The MTA is silent as to the skills required to be a seafarer, whereas the SSA 
contained detailed provisions. It is obvious that, given the manual aspects of their 
role, seafarers need to be fit and able and it was an offence to ignore this 
requirement or to fraudulently obtain or use certification dictating that a seafarer 
was able-bodied.174 For example, a seafarer needed to serve as a trimmer for three 
months before progressing to a fireman or greaser.175 Cooks also had to have a 
certificate of competency and it was an offence if any person faked, forged or 
fraudulently altered this document.176 Regulations could dictate the issuing of 
medical fitness certificates and it was an offence to fail to comply.177  
b. Wages and compensation  
There are no provisions in the MTA relating to the payment of maritime wages. 
In the SSA, the obligation to pay seafarers lay with the master (and the owner) and 
not to do so was an offence.178 The master had to pay seafarers, even if they were 
left behind,179 within prescribed time limits and following legislative direction. 
Under the SSA there were also historical provisions relating to the master having to 
set up facilities for seafarers to receive remitted wages to a relative or a savings 
                                                        
172 Sections 49(12) and 182 of the SSA. There were strict requirements surrounding the apprentice 
indenture under the SSA (sections 29(6) and 30(3)). Apprentices were allowed and a master 
committed an offence if the apprentice was not 15 years old or of sufficient health and strength 
(section 29(6)). There is no comparable apprentice scheme in the MTA. 
173 Section 49(12) of the SSA. 
174 Able-bodied was referred to as “A.B.” in the SSA: See section. 
175 Sections 53 and 54. 
176 Section 136(7). 
177 Section 140. 
178 Section 89 of the SSA; section 113 of the Industrial Relations Act 1973; and section 145 of the 
Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1925. 
179 Sections 120(2) and 121(6) of the SSA. 
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bank;180 setting out the time and mode of payment;181 and imprisonment for up to 
five years for every person who granted money orders for a fraudulent intent.182 It 
was previously illegal for any person to receive remuneration for providing 
employment to a seafarer.183  
c. Termination of employment 
The MTA does not provide any situations where employment will be 
terminated; the SSA did provide such situations. Seafarers’ employment could be 
discharged only in accordance with the Act otherwise the master committed an 
offence. A discharge had to occur in front of a superintendent;184 a certificate of 
discharge was an entitlement;185 and if discharge happened outside of NZ then there 
were specific mandatory rules to follow.186 The certificate of discharge was an 
important document for seafarers to have by right and this is highlighted by the 
penalties whereby a master found guilty of failing to provide a certificate would be 
liable to pay the effected seafarer the sum of one day’s pay for every day that 
certification was withheld.187 Upon a change in master, the old master was under an 
obligation to hand over all the documentation in his custody relating to stability, the 
navigation of the ship, and relating to the crew.188  
Alongside the master’s obligations in the SSA, were the obvious obligations on 
the seafarer themselves. These were reasonable but were not replicated in the MTA. 
Seafarers were criminalised if they made a false report; altered a certificate of 
discharge; assisted someone to commit fraud; or used an altered, false or forged 
certificate.189 If a seaman failed to make the voyage due to illness or accident, 
                                                        
180 Section 86(2). 
181 Section 87(3). 
182 Section 87(3). 
183 Section 48. 
184 Section 57(2). 
185 Section 58(6). 
186 Sections 60(4) and 61(4). 
187 Sections 58(7) and 61(5). 
188 Section 176(2). 
189 Section 63. 
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discharge was deemed190 and the master had the reasonable duty to advise the 
authorities and organise the attendance of a medical examination.191 The SSA also 
required seafarers to be paid their wages in the presence of the superintendent 
when discharged.192  
d. Employment and references 
The MTA contains an offence regarding the employment of seafarers in a 
narrow area: Every person is liable if they knowingly employ seafarers without 
appropriate maritime documentation.193 Presumably, the onus is on seafarers 
themselves to produce satisfactory documentation but the master must request it in 
order to satisfy his obligations. This was an offence against the master under the 
SSA.194 Seafarers were guilty of an offence if they made a false statement as to their 
last ship or their identity195 and every person was liable for an offence if he offered 
himself, or knowingly offered a suspended person, for employment.196 This would 
obviously cover seafarers. Likewise, a seaman had to produce his certificate of 
previous discharge before signing an agreement – if he failed to do so (or falsely 
declared) the existence of such certificate, he was liable upon summary conviction 
for up to three months imprisonment of a fine of $200.197  
e. Obligations on birth or death 
Once again, the MTA does not provide any obligations or offences on the birth 
or death of someone on-board a ship. In the SSA, the master had to record births and 
                                                        
190 Section 66(2). 
191 Section 67(1A).  
192 Section 70(4). 
193 Section 69B of the MTA.  
194 Sections 17(7)(a) and 17(7)(b) of the SSA. Under sections 46(3) and 46A(2), it was also an offence 
not to comply with local law relative to the engagement and not to get the agreement legally 
approved by the superintendent.  
195 Section 165(1). 
196 Section 40A(11). 
197 Sections 42(5) and 42(6). 
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deaths on-board in his logbook and register the birth within 48 hours of arrival at a 
NZ or commonwealth port otherwise an offence was committed.198  
The SSA also contained an offence relating to the failure abroad to comply with 
provisions of the Act as to the property of deceased seaman or seamen left 
behind.199 The penalty of this offence shows the severity of this action: a fine not 
exceeding three times the value of the property or, if value cannot be ascertained, up 
to $200.200 As with other parts in the SSA, it was also an offence to forge or 
fraudulently alter any document to obtain such property, which was punishable by 
up to five years imprisonment.201 The master committed an offence if a body of a 
deceased seaman was not buried on shore “with all convenient dispatch”.202 
f. Discipline  
The MTA does not deal with crimes of discipline nor the failure to report for 
duty.203 This was a particular concern under the SSA: it was an offence to combine 
with other crew to disobey orders, neglect duties or impede the ship or its voyage204 
and to not report for duties without reasonable cause.205 If a seafarer received an 
advance or money for expenses, and wilfully, or through misconduct, failed to join 
his ship then he was liable for a months’ imprisonment as well as a fine.206 The 
master also had discretion to withhold non-reporting crew their discharge 
certification for up to a month meaning they could not be legally employed on 
another vessel.207 Similarly, the SSA also has detailed offences relating to enticing a 
                                                        
198 Section 506.  
199 Section 104. 
200 Section 104. 
201 Section 115. 
202 Section 186. 
203 The Maritime Crimes Act 1999 does cover some discipline crimes as relating to terrorism. The SSA 
went further than criminalising terrorist acts. 
204 Section 164(d) of the SSA. The penalty under this offence range from up to one months’ 
imprisonment, forfeiting wages of up to one months’ pay, or a fine not exceeding $100.  
205 Sections 44(3) and 164(a). Seafarers forfeited two days’ pay if they committed an offence by 
deserting or absented themselves without leave: Section 157(2). 
206 Section 82. 
207 Section 44(4). There were obligations on the master in this situation. If a seafarer failed to report 
before the ship set sail from NZ, the master may be required to lodge their wages and certificate of 
discharge with the superintendent as well as making a corresponding entry in the logbook (section 
65(2)). If a seafarer was left behind, a certificate of a proper officer was required whether the cause 
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seafarer to desert their ship or stowing away on a vessel (or helping someone else to 
stow away or desert).208 The SSA also outlined specific discipline requirements as it 
was an offence to disobey lawful instructions from a master;209 continually neglect 
duties;210 assault another seafarer (including the master);211 for a master to assault 
any seafarer;212 wilfully damage or steal ship property, stores or cargo;213 or 
smuggle items.214  
g. Impairment of duties  
All seafarers, whether master or crew, have an obligation to not undertake 
their professional duties while intoxicated. It is an offence for any seafarer to 
perform, or attempt to perform, designated safety, security, or marine 
environmental duties on a ship while intoxicated.215 The levels of intoxication must 
not exceed a breath alcohol limit of 250ml per litre of breath or blood alcohol limit 
of 50 ml per 100ml of blood.216 The penalties highlight the seriousness of this 
offence: penalties are imprisonment of up to 12 months or a fine not exceeding 
$10,000.217 There are also related offences regarding refusal of testing by an 
enforcement officer (the police) with the same penalties.218 Seafarers can be 
arrested without warrant for suspicion of breaching these sections.219 The SSA did 
not state a particular level of intoxication as to create an offence, but if loss or 
                                                                                                                                                                     
was unfitness, inability to continue to sea, desertion, disappearance, or any other reason (section 
119(3)). The master was criminally liable for not providing this certification without cause. 
208 Section 173(1). Offences also applied to foreign ships per section 477.  
209 Sections 164(b) and 164(c). The penalties under these sections range from up to three months’ 
imprisonment, a fine not exceed $40, or forfeiting wages. 
210 Sections 164(b) and 164(c). The penalties under these sections range from up to three months’ 
imprisonment, a fine not exceed $40, or forfeiting wages. 
211 Section 164(e). The penalties for this offence is imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months 
or to a fine not exceeding $100.  
212 Section 164(1A). The penalties for this offence is imprisonment for a term not exceeding six 
months or to a fine not exceeding $100.  
213 Section 164(f). The penalties for this offence is imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months 
or forfeiting wages.  
214 Section 164(g). The penalty for this offence is to pay the master or owner a sum equal to the loss 
or damage suffered.  
215 Section 40 of the MTA.  
216 Sections 40, 40C(1) and40C(2).  
217 Section 40.  
218 Sections 40D and 40E.  
219 Section 40F.  
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damage to the ship or persons happened due to wilful breach or neglect of duty, or 
while in a state of intoxication, then the seafarer committed a criminal offence.220 
These offences are comparable in practice.  
These sections of the MTA were recently amended by the Maritime Transport 
Amendment Act 2013 to implement international standards to establish a globally 
applicable alcohol limit for merchant seafarers.221 The level of intoxication is the 
same for drivers of NZ roads after the 2014 amendments to the Land Transport Act 
1998. Employers are able to impose a lower limit as the two Cook Strait ferry 
operators have reportedly done with a zero-alcohol limit.222 The first successful 
prosecution under these provisions occurred in March 2015 when Captain Kumar of 
the African Harrier (a 37,000 tonne fertilizer carrier ship) pleaded guilty in the 
Tauranga District when found with a breath alcohol limit of 1229 micrograms – 
more than five times the intoxication limit.223 He was fined $3,000.224 
This statutory level of intoxication reflects consensus of global best practice as 
applied to seafarers’ on-board merchant seagoing ships.225 Interestingly, while 
international law in this area mentions both alcohol and drugs levels, it only 
imposes testing for alcohol.226 The amendments to the MTA follow this and only 
mandate testing for alcohol intoxication. Drug testing can be directed by owners of 
ships (as employers) for fitness for duty or general health and safety concerns.227 
The practical effect of these amendments on seafarers is yet to be reported on. 
                                                        
220 Section 163 of the SSA. 
221 Section 12 of the Maritime Transport Amendment Act 2013 which was previously the Marine 
Legislation Bill 2012; Maurice Williamson (11 September 2012) 683 NZPD 5080; and International 
Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers 1367 UNTS 1362 
(opened for signature 7 July 1978, entered into force 28 April 1984). 
222 Phil Twyford (Labour) (11 September 2012) 683 NZPD 5080. 
223 Section 40B of the MTA; Maritime New Zealand “Maritime NZ welcomes sentencing of Master with 
excess breath alcohol” (23 March 2015) Maritime New Zealand <www.maritimenz.govt.nz>; and 
Sandra Conchie “Ship master five times over alcohol limit” (23 March 2015) New Zealand Herald 
<www.nzherald.co.nz>. 
224 Maritime New Zealand, as above.  
225 Ministry of Transport and Ministry for the Environment above n 116, at 69. 
226 At 69-70. The Convention does not mandate random testing for either: at 70. 
227 At 70. 
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D Financial and regulatory responsibilities 
The maritime industry requires financial, investment and insurance input. The 
master or the owner will oversee most of these inputs under Part 24 of the MTA. 
However, there are a couple of incidents whereby seafarers individually could be 
held responsible for breaches. For example, there are comprehensive obligations 
relating to the payment of the oil pollution fund and levies.228 Levies must be paid to 
obtain a certificate of clearance. If this Part is not complied with, then every person 
commits a crime.229 The onus here really lies with the master or owner but the 
wording of the Act suggests that seafarers could also be prosecuted. 
Insurance omissions have criminal liability in the MTA. It is an offence for the 
master to enter or leave NZ waters without a certificate of insurance and a bunker 
oil certificate of insurance (if required).230 Penalties for this nonexistence of 
insurance are the maximum penalties provided in the MTA (relating to the 
discharge of pollution):231 Imprisonment of up to two years or a fine not exceeding 
$200,000.232 There are a few additional minor offences that the master would be 
liable for relating to carrying insurance or failing to produce the certificates upon 
request.233 There is a ‘reasonable excuse’ partial defence) which may protect the 
master against fake or fictitious policies that are unknown to the master.234  
E Administration of justice 
Offences relating to the administration of justice occur in all pieces of 
legislation involving authorities; the maritime industry is no exception. This area of 
criminalisation could apply in a number of diverse situations outside of the areas of 
risk previously discussed in this paper. The MTA contains numerous offences 
relating to the administration of justice such as obstruction or prevention of 
authorised personnel from performing duties. There is a catch-all offence whereby if 
                                                        
228 See Sections 333 and 337 of the MTA for example.  
229 Section 340(2). Levies are required under section 338. 
230 Section 367(1). 
231 See section 327. 
232 Section 367(1). 
233 Sections 367(2) and 367(3). 
234 See section 367(1). 
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the MTA says a record must be maintained, then every person commits an offence if 
they fail to do so.235 Unsurprisingly, these offences also existed in the SSA. The SSA 
outlined each obligation alongside the requirement to maintain or present 
documents if requested but in substance the obligations in the SSA and MTA are the 
same.236 There is no increased criminalisation here.  
a. Obstruction 
There is a wide obligation in the MTA whereby every person is guilty of an 
offence if they obstruct, impede, delay, hinder or deceive any person acting under 
the MTA237 or under previous legislation.238 It is a defence if evidence of authority is 
not produced.239 These MTA offences may be triggered if, for example, any person 
physically obstructs an enforcement officer (the police) from testing a seafarer for 
alcohol intoxication. There were comparable offences for wilful obstruction of 
surveyors and inspectors in the SSA that were applicable to every person, including 
all seafarers.240 If any person failed to comply with orders from appropriate 
authorities, or wilfully obstructed the authorities, the MPA created an offence 
punishable by a fine not exceeding $500,241 or $10,000 for each day of non-
compliance if the Minister makes the orders which are disobeyed.242 The SSA also 
                                                        
235 Section 405. 
236 Previous offences included: anyone failing to comply with a legal request to produce 
documentation (section 78(2) of the SSA); against a master for not maintaining an official logbook 
stating discharge of employment, provisions, illness, death, or wages of deceased seafarers (sections 
177, 178A and 183 of the SSA); if the aforementioned logbook was not delivered by the master to the 
superintendent within 48 hours or within six months if the ship was being transferred (section 
179(3) of the SSA); if the master did not deposit required documents within 48 hours of arriving at a 
foreign port (sections 180 and 189(4) of the SSA); against chief engineers who failed to maintain an 
engine room log (section 181(8) of the SSA); for anyone if a logbook entry was not made on every 
occasion involving the discharge of oil (section 11(1) of the MPA); or if any person made a 
fraudulently or misleading record in the logbook under the MPA (section 11(8) of the MPA). The 
preceding offences are now covered by the general provision of the MTA (section 405). 
237 Section 404(1) of the MTA.  
238 Section 15H(6) of the SSA.  
239 Section 404(4) of the MTA.  
240 See sections 15E(7)(a), 15E(7)(b), 15E(6) and 15G(6) of the SSA. The master, crew and 
passengers are expressly mentioned in section 15E(6) of the SSA. 
241 Section 17(8) of the MPA.  
242 Section 28.  
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made it an offence if the master refused to let crew go ashore to complain about 
these acts.243 
These provisions are reasonable and extend to all persons by virtue of general 
criminal law. Thus, it is rational that seafarers may face prosecution for these 
obstruction offences. In practice this charge has been discussed, not but used, 
against Greenpeace activists protesting Petrobras drilling off the East Coast of NZ,244 
and hypothetically section 405 could have been applied to the Greenpeace activists 
who protested in the Artic at the Prirazlomnaya platform in Russia if the same facts 
occurred in NZ.245 
b. False information 
In the MTA there is a catch-all offence relating to giving false, fraudulent or 
misleading information whereby every person in breach of this section faces up to 
12 months imprisonment or a $10,000 fine.246 The penalty identifies that this is a 
serious offence, but one which exists in all pieces of legislation where information is 
to be exchanged with officials.247 In the SSA, such provisions were generally 
stipulated per document rather than in a catch-all provision as in the MTA. Though, 
both legislative frameworks would operate the same in practice.248  
It was also an offence against every person who certified, forged or tampered 
with evidence in proceedings249 and a crime for anyone who forged or misused 
documents generally.250 There is a comparable offence in the MTA for every person 
                                                        
243 Section 151(3) of the SSA. 
244 Aaron Gray-Block “Petrobras abandons plans for deep sea oil drilling in New Zealand” (4 
December 2012) Greenpeace International <www.greenpeace.org>; and Bevan Marten “International 
recent developments: New Zealand” (2014) 38 Tulane Maritime Law Journal 623 at 633. 
245 “Activists, actor Lucy Lawless arrested for Shell Arctic drillship occupation” (27 February 2012) 
Greenpeace International <www.greenpeace.org>. 
246 Sections 406, and 407(3) of the MTA.  
247 See section 342 of the Immigration Act 2009; section 231 of the Fisheries Act 1996; and sections 
46B, 46C, 46D, 49, 52C, and 56 of the Civil Aviation Act 1990. 
248 Such as section 63 of the SSA relating to a certificate of discharge.  
249 Section 494.  
250 Section 503.  
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who communicates false information, knowing such information to be false, 
affecting the safety of a product, ship or facility.251 
V. What would happen in NZ? 
This paper will now discuss what would hypothetically happen under NZ law if 
the facts from four infamous international scenarios occurred in NZ. This analysis 
involves guesswork and such results may turn out different than mentioned below 
as a result of many factors, including political reaction and mitigations. It is evident 
from the discussion in Part IV that the SSA contained detailed offences compared to 
the generalist provisions in the MTA. This difference reveals itself in these cases as 
seafarers in Erika, Prestige, Nissos Amorgos and Tasman Spirit would likely be 
charged under the same MTA provisions. There is not the same range of penalties in 
NZ as available in some overseas jurisdictions and thus it is becomes evident that 
criminalisation in NZ would not occur to the same extent. Current penalties under 
NZ law are significantly more reasonable than in some other coastal states. 
Also discussed hereunder is the Rena case; this case prompted a domestic 
discussion of criminalisation in the maritime industry. This case is important as an 
example of what happened in practice in this legal area and thus informs the 
hypothetical situations that follow.  
A Rena prosecution 
This criminalisation discussion was reflected in the NZ media in 2011 after the 
grounding of Rena; this provides the primary NZ case study involving criminal 
prosecutions relating to health and safety and pollution offences. The container ship 
Rena, built in 1990, was a Liberian-flagged, Greek-owned, container ship which was 
travelling in NZ waters after leaving Napier to Tauranga.252 In the early hours of 5 
                                                        
251 Section 67(1) the MTA.  
252 Marten, above n 245, at 623; Transport Accident Investigation Commission Interim Report: Marine 
inquiry 11-204 Containership MV Rena grounding on Astrolabe Reef 5 October 2011 (2012) at iii; and 
Kerryn Webster and Felicity Monterio “Assessing the Impact of the Rena Disaster” Wilson Harle 
<http://www.wilsonharle.com/assessing-the-impact-of-the-rena-disaster>. 
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October 2011, the Rena struck the Astrolabe Reef off the coast of Tauranga carrying 
approximately 1400 containers and an estimated 1700 tonnes of fuel.253  
The Master of the Rena, Captain Balomaga, was charged under section 65(1) of 
the MTA for operating a vessel in a manner causing unnecessary danger or risk.254 
The second officer in charge of navigation, Laonil Relon, faced almost identical 
charges.255 The two seafarers plead guilty to these charges on 29 February 2012 and 
were sentenced to seven months’ imprisonment on 25 May 2012.256 This was the 
correct outcome as an “example of a justifiable exercise of criminal jurisdiction 
against seafarers” as their navigation was negligent and directly affected NZ’s 
waters, environment and personal property.257 In this case, unlike some of the 
earlier cases examined in this paper, criminalisation was appropriate due to the 
gross negligence of those seafarers charged.258 
This incident highlighted some failings of the current legislative regime, 
particularly in relation to insurance and the recovery of costs. It was the catalyst for 
the 2013 reform of the MTA: “The fact of the matter is that there was a disaster in 
[NZ] that has led to this greater impetus for these protocols to be enacted through 
legislation.”259 For the purposes of this paper however the criminalisation of 
                                                        
253 Marten, as above, at 624; Transport Accident Investigation Commission, as above, at 1; and 
Webster and Monterio, as above.  
254 Captain Balomaga was also charged under section 338(1)(b) of the RMA for discharging harmful 
substance into the water from a ship and under section 116 of the Crimes Act 1961 for wilfully 
attempting to pervert the course of justice by altering the ship’s documents subsequent to the 
grounding. Detailed discussion on these charges are outside the scope of this paper. 
255 Webster and Monterio, above n 253. 
256 See Wolff J in Maritime New Zealand v Daina Shipping Company DC Tauranga CRI 2012-070-1872 
26 October 2012; Marten, above n 245, at 623; Webster and Monterio, above n 253; and Alexis Lai 
“Captain pleads guilty over New Zealand cargo ship disaster” (6 March 2012) CNN <www.cnn.com>. 
257 Bevan Marten “Submission on the Marine Legislation Bill” (8 October 2012) at [15]. 
258 See Transport Accident Investigation Commission, above n 253, at 1. The owner of the Rena - 
Daina Shipping Company, a Liberian shell company - was fined $300,000 for breaching section 
338(1)(b) of the RMA after a guilty plea. The charterer of the vessel, the Mediterranean Shipping 
Company, was not charged in relation to the grounding. These findings are outside the scoop of this 
paper. For further discussions see: Transport Accident Investigation Commission, above n 253, at 10; 
Maritime New Zealand v Daina Shipping Company (unreported) District Court, Tauranga, CRI 2012-
070-1872, 26 October 2012, Wolff J; Marten, above n 245, at 625; “Rena owners fined $300,000” (26 
October 2012) Bay of Plenty Times <www.nzherald.co.nz>; and Webster and Monterio, above n 253. 
259 Jami-Lee Ross (National), (11 September 2012) 683 NZPD 5080. 
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seafarers did not change under these reforms; such reforms were focused on ship-
owners and port operators’ liability. 
B Future possibilities  
The biggest area of criminal responsibility in international maritime discourse 
is pollution. Criminal cases involving pollution and its after effects far outnumber 
any other examples. I thus examined four cases – the Erika, Prestige, Nissos Amorgos 
and Tasman Spirit – and applied their facts to hypothetical NZ situations. While 
these four cases contain vastly different fact scenarios and offenders received 
varying penalties in reality, in NZ the masters would likely be charged under the 
same MTA provisions and receive drastically lower punishments. Some seafarers 
were acquitted, however the risk of charges remain, and it is evident that the 
penalty they are risking under criminal law in NZ is lower than elsewhere 
(particularly in France).  
It must also be remembered that general criminal law may also apply to the 
same acts undertaken by seafarers when undertaking their professional roles. For 
example, the Captains of both Sewol and Zim Mexico (as discussed in Part II) would 
likely face wrongful death (manslaughter) charges under the Crimes Act 1961 or for 
the discharge of harmful substances into the water from a ship under the RMA.260 
This application of general criminal law is outside the scope of this paper though the 
regimes may overlap; I focus on current liability under the MTA. 
a. Negligent safety certification – Erika 
The Indian Master of Erika, Captain Mathur, was arrested in France when his 
ship caused oil pollution damage in December 1999 that was, at least partly, outside 
his knowledge.261 The Maltese-flagged Italian owned tanker, which was almost 25 
                                                        
260 Alongside the MTA charges, Captain Balomaga of the Rena was convicted under this section 
338(1)(b) of the RMA. He was also convicted under section 116 of the Crimes Act 1961 for wilfully 
attempting to pervert the course of justice by altering the ship’s documents subsequent to the 
grounding. 
261 International Transport Workers’ Federation, above n 1, at 30. The Captain and crew were later 
praised for managing to launch a lifeboat in tough weather: Permanent Commission of Enquiry into 
Accidents at Seas, above n 45, at 33. 
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years old, broke in two after weathering storm damage, eventually sinking 60 miles 
off Penmarch Point in Brittany, France. It spilled an estimated 14,000 tonnes of oil 
into the ocean causing large-scale devastation to the water, to wildlife and to 
property.262 At the time of its sinking, the tanker was chartered by Total-Fina-Elf in 
good faith based on the safety certification issued by RINA (an Italian shipping 
classification society).263 The ship had current certification – meaning she was 
considered ‘safe’ – and she was travelling with the correct certifications required by 
law and industry.  
Captain Karun was arrested and charged with causing pollution at sea and 
endangering the lives of others, despite having no responsibility for the 
certifications and the accumulation of rust and poor wear of Erika due to her age.264 
Captain Karun’s “reputation and moral are in tatters” due to this imprisonment:265 
…'What about the other players? For no fault of my own I am being put in 
prison! I am only operating the ship and I am the one who is jailed. I am not the 
one who owned the ship. What about the rest?’ 
He was eventually acquitted of all charges by the Paris Tribunal after eight years of 
legal proceedings.266 The resulting environmental mess from this ship became the 
catalyst for European reform and prompted EU legislative changes as discussed in 
Part II(B).  
Given ships rely heavily on industry certification, and that the age of 
merchant ships is ever increasing due to the slowing of demand and international 
exports by water, it is not far-fetched that a similar disaster may happen in NZ 
                                                        
262 See Permanent Commission of Enquiry into Accidents at Seas, above n 45; Hare, above n 6, at 3; 
Oving, above n 6, at 6; and “The scandal of the Erika” (16 August 2000) BBC News 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk>. 
263 Permanent Commission of Enquiry into Accidents at Seas, above n 45, at [3]; Oving, above n 6, at 
6; and “The scandal of the Erika,” as above. 
264 “The scandal of the Erika,” as above. 
265 As above. 
266 Oving, above n 6, at 6; and Vincent Foley and Christopher Nolan “In the Erika judgment – 
Environmental liability and places of refuge: A sea change in civil and criminal responsibility that the 
maritime community must heed” (2008) 33 Tulane Maritime Law Journal 41 at 44. 
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waters.267 This case is analogous to Rena but with over eight times the fuel leakage. 
Captain Karun would be charged with the same offences under the MTA (operating a 
vessel in a manner causing unnecessary danger or risk) and would face 12 months 
imprisonment or a fine of up to $10,000 for each day of delay.268 These MTA 
penalties are however greater than under previous NZ legislation. For example, 
discharge or escape of oil from any ship was an offence under the MPA and the 
master would be liable for clean-up costs and a $50,000 fine.269 This area of 
increased criminality echoes the intellectual concerns surrounding pollution and the 
natural environment – importantly, there is now the option of imprisonment as 
punishment.  
Captain Karun may have also faced prosecution under the MTA as he 
allegedly did not notify authorities of the inability to contain the spill in a timely 
manner and may not have followed all directions when this became an 
emergency.270 The first offence has a fine of up to $10,000; the latter offence (section 
253) has a penalty of up to two years imprisonment or a fine of up to $200,000 and 
$10,000 penalty.  
If guilty, Captain Karun faced substantially less penalties for all these offences 
than he faced under EU law, however they are larger than in previous NZ 
legislation.271 
b. Poor state of repair –Prestige 
Two years after Erika sunk, in November 2002 there was a similar pollution 
incident in which an elderly Master weathered the blame even though he did 
everything in his power to mitigate the effects of the unfortunate situation. This ship 
was the Prestige.272 Captain Mangouras was held accountable when his ship sunk off 
                                                        
267 See Maritime Knowledge Centre “International Shipping Facts and Figures – Information 
Resources on Trade, Safety, Security, Environment” (6 March 2012) International Maritime 
Knowledge Centre <www.imo.org> at [3.2] and [3.8]; and “The scandal of the Erika,” above n 263. 
268 Section 65(1) of the MTA. 
269 Sections 10(a) and 21(2) of the MPA.  
270 Sections 19(4), 253(4) and 317 of the MTA.  
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the coasts of Spain and Brittany, leaking an approximate 64,000 tonnes of oil into 
the sea, despite attempting to find refuge from Spain, France and Portugal in order 
to undertake salvage operations.273 This caused the largest environmental disaster 
in Spanish history.274  
Captain Mangouras was arrested at 70 years of age in Spain and held for three 
months with bail set at a high €3,000,000.275 He remained in a Spanish jail for 85 
days before bail was posted and he remained under house arrest for a further two 
years.276 Criminal legal proceedings continued against the Master for eight years 
despite most industry persons and organisations believing that he not at fault.277 
Finally, aged 78, he was acquitted of all charges regarding negligence and pollution, 
but was convicted of disobeying Spanish authorities during the crisis and sentenced 
to nine months imprisonment (with time already served).278 The Prestige’s chief 
engineer and a senior Spanish official were also ultimately acquitted; the ship’s 
Filipino second officer is reportedly still on the run from authorities.279 The Spanish 
criminal court determined that it was impossible to establish criminal responsibility 
against the acquitted individuals as the disaster was partly due to the 26-year old 
tanker’s poor state of repair.280 “Judges said the leak was caused by deficient 
maintenance which the crew did not know about”281 and thus individual seafarers 
should not be held criminally accountable for.  
As with Erika, this case draws parallels with Rena but with a massive 37x more 
fuel leakage than Rena. Although he might still be acquitted, Captain Mangouras 
would likely face charges against operating a vessel in a manner causing 
unnecessary danger or risk and would face 12 months imprisonment or a fine of up 
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to $10,000 for each day of delay, which is in no way comparable to the heavy 
penalties he faced under Spanish law (up to US$3,000,000 and four years 
imprisonment).282 He would also be charged with a similar offence to that of which 
he was eventually convicted of: failing to follow lawful instructions by those in 
authority facing a fine of $10,000 and $2,000 per day of non-compliance283 together 
with not following all directions when this became an emergency situation.284  
c. Pilotage –Nissos Amorgos and Tasman Spirit 
Globally, seafarers have been held accountable in criminal law for incidents 
when they were not in control of their vessel. In February 1997, Nissos Amorgos 
struck the bottom of Venezuela’s Maracaibo Channel while under pilot.285 There was 
a pattern of recent groundings in this Channel and Nissos Amorgos was one of three 
tankers to run aground in just a two-week period.286 This time however, an 
estimated 7,000 tonnes of oil escaped from the ship.287 After a series of appeals 
Captain Spyropoulos was eventually acquitted of any criminal offence; the pilot and 
port authorities were never charged.288 In their investigations, the Venezuelan 
authorities found that there were underwater bank collapses as well as submerged 
objects in the seabed. This was outside of the knowledge of the seafarers as well as 
the authorities.289 This outcome is likely to be the same in NZ.290 
A similar situation happened five years later. In July 2003 a Maltese tanker ran 
aground at the entrance to Karachi Port, Pakistan while under licenced pilot from 
the port authority.291 This time there were no changes in the underwater geography 
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contributing to the crash. Tasman Spirit proceeded to break in half and an estimated 
12,000 tonnes of oil initially spilled into the Arabian Sea. Seven crew members were 
arrested – including the Master, chief engineer, third officer, second engineer and 
quartermaster – and held for nine months and later released reportedly without 
charge.292 While these seafarers would not face any piloting charges, they may face 
similar charges to those discussed above in relation to Prestige and Erika.  
C What is the ‘worst case scenario’?  
I hypothetically looked at a ‘worst case scenario’ in NZ. An uninsured ship 
operating outside its prescribed limits runs aground, discharges oil and the 
intoxicated master makes the decision to store hazardous waste on the seabed 
before proceeding to a nearby port. The Captain would likely face the same MTA 
charges as Rena – operating a vessel in a manner causing unnecessary danger or risk 
– and would face 12 months imprisonment293 and $10,000 and/or an additional 12 
months imprisonment for operating a ship outside its limits.294 He would also be 
liable for the two largest penalties under the MTA as the ship did not have the 
required insurance295 and for discharging harmful substances into the sea or 
seabed.296 Both of these offences have penalties of up to two years or a fine up to 
$200,000. The Master will also be liable for storing waste on the seabed (for a fine of 
up to $200,000; $10,000 for each day of continuing offence; and costs associated 
with putting the act right),297 as well as an additional 12 months imprisonment or a 
fine not exceeding $10,000 for being intoxicated while in charge of the vessel.298 
There may be other minor offences that also attach to these facts, and mitigation 
actions may be apparent, however the point to note is that these offences against the 
Master equate up to seven years in prison and/or a fine of $620,000 in this ‘worst 
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case scenario.299 These penalties are minimal compared to other jurisdictions, such 
as various EU states where the majority of fines range from €150,000 to €1,500,000 
and imprisonment of up to five years.300 In France, high penalties of €15 million and 
10 years’ imprisonment attach intentional pollution acts alone.301 These facts 
illustrate that the penalties that attach to maritime criminal acts in NZ are 
comparably low in the international discussion.  
VI. Conclusions 
I conclude that over the past fifty years, there has only been a minimal increase 
in the criminalisation of seafarers in NZ. Increased criminalisation has happened 
particularly in the area of pollution, including the handling dangerous or hazardous 
cargo. For example, there were no offences dealing specially with hazardous waste 
in previous NZ legislation; such situations would have fallen under all-purpose 
health and safety requirements of the SSA regarding dangerous goods or 
unseaworthiness. The increase in criminalisation in this area in NZ is reasonable 
having regard to the positions of responsibility and outcomes of wrongdoings. 
 This increase in pollution criminalisation is a product of the evolving nature of 
the maritime industry and education lessons from past disasters such as Erika and 
Prestige. The one recent case in NZ of holding seafarers criminal accountable in this 
area – Rena – shows that those in charge were held accountable, particularly the 
master: “The master is an easy target in shipping cases because he or she is 
physically present, in a position of responsibility, and subject to the local 
jurisdiction.”302 This follows international trends due to learning from 
environmental disasters and is consistent with the master being held to a higher 
standard of care because they have more responsibility on-board. This high profile 
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criminal case of Rena showed a correct attitude to those in charge who neglected 
their duties and caused significant damage.  
Prosecutions are heavily reliant on the factual situations and very few have 
been subject to NZ court scrutiny so it is difficult to determine the scope of 
criminalisation in practice outside the Rena incident. I thus applied the facts of four 
infamous cases to hypothetical situations in NZ in light of Rena, and I found that all 
Captains may have faces charges under the same MTA provision as faced in Rena: 
operating a vessel in a manner causing unnecessary danger or risk (section 65(1)). 
The facts of each of the cases – Erika, Prestige, Nissos Amorgos and Tasman Spirit – 
vary and thus it is difficult to predict what penalties would be imposed. In any event, 
the penalty under this provision, being 12 months imprisonment or a fine of up to 
$10,000 for each day of delay, is significantly less than those in other jurisdictions: a 
global study indicated that average fines in EU states were approximately £580,000 
for illegal discharges.303 The extreme example is France which affected the Captain 
of Erika, where fines range from €800,000 for lower-end pollution caused by 
negligence to €15 million and 10 years’ imprisonment for intention pollution.304 The 
Captains may also face up to two years in prison and a fine of up to $200,000 under 
NZ law if they do not follow directions from authorities, including MNZ, in an 
emergency,305 though this is reliant on the facts. Of course, the penalties may change 
having regard to the facts and mitigating situations.  
More generally, I found that under NZ law, seafarers are not usually held 
criminally accountable for actions under maritime criminal law unless the act or 
omission is done intentionally. The burden of the vast majority of offences lies with 
the master in both the previous and current legislative frameworks, as they are the 
individuals with the obligation and the responsibility to influence situations. The 
master is the person in charge of a vessel and must follow the duties outlined in 
section 19 of the MTA. Thus the master is held to a higher standard as a person in 
                                                        
303 International Maritime Organization “Analysis and evaluation of deficiency reports and 
mandatory reports under MARPOL for 2011” in Giovannini, above n 20, at 47. 
304 North P&I, above n 25, at 5.  
305 Section 19(4) of the MTA.  
47        CRIMINALISATION OF SEAFARERS – NZ  
MIRANDA GRANGE - 300237003 
responsibility and is expressly named in various offences contained the MTA. There 
is a much larger position of responsibility on the master with the outcome of 
criminal sanctions than those of a general seafarer.  
This paper thus concludes that despite the industry claiming that there is a 
worrying trend towards criminalisation internationally, this is not a reality in NZ. 
Nothing in legislation or in practice has been uncovered to suggest that that vast or 
unreasonable criminalisation happens to seafarers. Masters are held to a greater 
standard due to their position of power in the shipping supply chain, as evidenced in 
Rena. The main area of increasing criminalisation against seafarers is in relation to 
pollution crime, including handling dangerous or hazardous cargo. The areas of 
increased criminalisation identified in Part IV of this paper reflect the global 
experience after environmental disasters, as well as NZ’s obligations under 
international agreements, global advances and human rights and/or employment 
trends. There are no current offence provisions that are unreasonable and the 
development between the SSA and the MTA is reasonable. The idea that seafarers 
are disproportionality blamed in the criminal system for incidents seems to be a 
political argument in NZ rather than evidenced in the legislation and case law. I 
therefore conclude that the criminalisation of seafarers under the current NZ 
legislative framework is reasonable and there is no case law suggesting that this 
changes in practice. 
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